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BUSINESS ESSAY
RAIDING THE ESTABLISHMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON TAKEOVER LAW
Samuel N. Levin*
I. UPSTART ENTREPRENEURS AND NOBLESSE OBLIGE
This essay offers a brief description of certain factors influencing
the development of the law governing corporate acquisitions. In its
most basic terms, the central issue in this field boils down to who
should control the wealth and power of our country. The issue en-
compasses choices based on political, economic and social values. It
is my thesis that implicit favoring of establishment groups over
"outsiders" underlies recent judicial and legislative actions bolster-
ing management's ability to fend off unwanted acquisitions.
The main political and economic movement of the 1980's was
conservative. There are two competing visions held by people who
call themselves "conservative." The first vision, what I refer to as
the "entrepreneurial" ideal, maintains that every individual should
be free to succeed; there should be social mobility; and private
property rights and free markets should be protected. This is the
Horatio Alger vision, which at its best fosters ingenuity, optimism
and economic development, and at its worst engenders greed and
materialistic excess. The entrepreneurial ideal reached its apogee
in the early years of the 20th Century when the founders of the
great industrial dynasties - Ford, Rockefeller, Vanderbilt and
Carnegie (all outsiders from humble backgrounds) built and owned
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vast corporate enterprises.' This entrepreneurial spirit resurfaced
in the 1980's, with a wave of men who acquired major portions of
the economy, such as Ronald Perelman, Carl Icahn and Carl Lind-
ner, who were all outside the establishment community.
The second conservative vision, in direct opposition to the en-
trepreneurial ideal, is the establishment vision. The establishment
vision favors control of institutions by elite insiders who suppos-
edly operate the institutions for the betterment of society. The es-
tablishment vision stresses tradition, stability and authority. The
patricians do not claim victory in a Darwinistic contest as the basis
for their status, but base their legitimacy on social breeding or ad-
herence to "community values." To its credit, the establishment
ideal may bring forth talented people who volunteer for public ser-
vice. Men such as Franklin Roosevelt and George Bush followed
the path of the English aristocracy which believed that gentlemen
should serve (and govern) the nation. However, the establishment
ideal tends to exclude outsiders, particularly women and minori-
ties. It may be that the residual strain of cultural and social elitism
in our society is a legacy of its pre-Revolutionary English heritage.
Although entrepreneurs built the American industrial machine,
we remember them as "robber barons." Carnegie was a "robber
baron" even though he gave away virtually all of his wealth. Un-
derneath the establishment vision lies a strong cultural dislike of
outsiders who pose a challenge. To some extent, this dislike is
based on the upstarts' roughness of character. The establishment
did not like Commodore Vanderbilt, for he was a rough-neck.
Founders of industrial dynasties were not clubmen. Yet, their non-
financial contributions to society are hallmarks. They left behind
Carnegie Hall and Morgan Library, splendid country estates, the
soaring towers of the Jazz Age in New York and Chicago and, iron-
ically, very establishment grandchildren.
There is, however, something more objectionable to the estab-
lishment's dislike of entrepreneurs. In The Predator's Ball, Connie
Bruck's book about the rise of corporate raiders, one participant
recounts the time when Ronald Perelman went to discuss a
friendly acquisition of Revlon with its CEO, Michele Bergerac.
"Bergerac checked with his friends, and most of them had never
heard of Ron Perelman, or if they had, they said he was young,
1. Even J.P. Morgan was an outsider. When Morgan was an undergraduate, none of the
Harvard "final" clubs would admit him. He built his own.
[Vol. 26:507508
TAKEOVER LAW
really aggressive, and Jewish. I think it was just beneath him [to
deal with Perelman]." 2 Bruck notes that the contest for control of
Revlon was indeed a class war, between the corporate America and
Wall Street elite, and the Drexel arrivistes .... Beneath these com-
plaints of principle lay something more visceral: the age-old hatred
for the outsider, always exacerbated when that undesirable other
dares to venture beyond his confines and encroach upon the elite's
preserve.3
Although Perelman was extremely wealthy, he was - by tempera-
ment, business practice and cultural .background - not a member
of the club.
II. THE 1980's REVOLUTION
In the 1980's, President Reagan became the chief political pro-
ponent of the entrepreneurial ideal. He was an outsider who
preached the liberating force of freedom, individualism and private
property. In tandem with Reagan's attack on bloated government
and bureaucrats out of touch with the people, corporate raiders
challenged managements that amassed crazy quilt conglomerates
in the 1960's and 1970's, more as monuments to their egos than
because of good business sense.4 The raiders asserted that these
custodians of the shareholders' wealth used it to acquire headquar-
ters, personal staffs and trappings that Napoleon would envy.'
A. The Establishment at Revlon
Revlon was one of the most celebrated conglomerates later ac-
quired by hostile takeover. It was founded by entrepreneur Charles
Revson and later managed by Michele Bergerac, an ex-ITT execu-
tive. ITT was a classic 1960's conglomerate, and Bergerac trans-
formed Revlon from a cosmetics giant into a conglomerate which
owned blood testing laboratories, a pharmaceuticals division and a
contact lens manufacturer. Revlon, once a model of en-
2. CONNME BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL 194 (1988).
3. Id. at 197.
4. Examples of 1960's conglomerates include ITT, Gulf & Western and Teledyne.
5. Michael Jensen pointed out that, "Corporate growth enhances the social prominence,
public prestige, and political power of senior executives ... the perquisites of the executive
suite can be substantial, and they usually increase with company size." Michael C. Jensen,
Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARv. Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1989 at 61.
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trepreneurial success, became a bastion of the establishment.
Bergerac's headquarters consisted of the top ten floors of the Gen-
eral Motors Building at 767 Fifth Avenue - the most expensive
location in New York. In addition to a fleet of cars and servants, he
had a Boeing 727 jet with a kingsize bed. The directors agreed that
if anyone bought the company Bergerac would receive $35 million
in golden parachute payments. After he was ousted and Ronald
Perelman bought the company, I spent two years working amidst
the luxury that Bergerac had amassed. I drank from his $300
glasses, and was served by liveried servants and an English butler.
The main dining room at Revlon looked like something from the
Czar's summer palace and the room where I held meetings could
have been used to film "The Last Emperor."
B. Storming the Bastion
In the 1980's marketplace for corporate control, billions of dol-
lars could be made and the lives of millions of workers, consumers
and investors affected. A massive shift occurred away from control
by non-owner managers (the leaders of the establishment) and to-
ward individuals who wanted to purchase corporations and return
them to private ownership. The value of leveraged acquisitions
rose from $4 billion in 1981 to $43 billion in 1988.6 From Beatrice
and Bell & Howell to Revlon and RJR, one after another, corpo-
rate citadels fell to the outsiders.7
The entrepreneurial acquirors offered to purchase the sharehold-
ers' stock at a premium price. They believed that conglomerates
amassed by managers in the 1960's and 1970's failed to deliver
promised synergies, thereby forcing stronger divisions of the com-
pany to carry weaker ones. The acquirors felt they could sell off
non-core assets to other companies or individuals who could put
them to better use. Through selling subsidiaries and cutting ex-
penses, the acquirors sought to make a profit. Sometimes they suc-
ceeded (Perelman made over a billion dollars on Revlon); other
times, as was the case with Campeau, Farley and Lorenzo, they did
not.
6. Douglas R. Ernst, Beating the LBO Odds: Safe Bets for Trade Creditors, CORP. CASH-
FLOW, May 1990, at 54.
7. One firm, KKR, acquired RJR/Nabisco, Safeway Stores, Beatrice, Duracell, Owens-Illi-
nois, Motel 6, Stop & Shop, Auto Zone and Hillsborough Holdings.
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Incumbent managements, who stood to lose their places at the
helm of society, were not wildly in favor of unsolicited offers to
purchase their companies. They instituted poison pills, golden
parachutes, and staggered boards. Their actions made it harder for
acquirors to step forward with tender offers, even though this de-
prived the shareholders of the right to decide whether to sell their
company. Management, the press, politicians and judges adopted
the establishment viewpoint, and referred to people who wanted to
buy companies over management's objections as "raiders." They
branded owners who challenged management as "speculators," "in-
surgents" or "dissidents." The decision to sell off parts of a con-
glomerate became "asset stripping" or a "bust-up." Finally, al-
though it merely referred to an offer to the shareholders which
management did not support, the term "hostile tender offer"
sounded positively evil, if not illegal.
The entrepreneurial raiders who sought to buy major corporate
enterprises allied with individual shareholder plaintiffs seeking to
enforce the right to sell their property. They squared off in the
Delaware courts against the forces of stability and establishment,
the directors and managements of large public companies. The
core legal issue was whether management could act to prevent the
shareholders from receiving unsolicited offers to buy the company.
The core issue was not whether a given offer should succeed, but
who would decide whether the company may be sold, its owners or
the management.
III. THE BATTLE IN THE COURTS
A. Building the Ramparts
In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum,8 the Delaware court faced a chal-
lenge to the Unocal board's actions to stop T. Boone Pickens from
completing a hostile tender offer for the company. The court noted
the "omnipresent specter" that, in adopting defensive measures,
management may act to keep itself in office, unconcerned with the
company's best interests. The Unocal court adopted a two-part
test to review directors' actions aimed at staving off an acquiror.
First, the board had to show reasonable grounds for believing that
the offer threatened the shareholders or corporate policy and effec-
8. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tiveness. Second, the board's response had to be reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed.
In Unocal, Pickens offered to pay cash for the first 51% of
shares tendered and junk bonds for the remainder. The court
agreed with the board in characterizing the offer as "coercive" in
that the offer could stampede the shareholders into tendering, even
if they felt the price was too low. If some shareholders failed to
tender, but enough of the other shareholders tendered so that
Pickens garnered his 51%, those who had not tendered would be
stuck with the "back end" junk bonds. Accordingly, the offer
threatened the shareholders' welfare, and the directors' response to
thwart Pickens was reasonable. If the court had stopped there,
even an honest raider would applaud - but it did not. In dicta,
the court said that shareholder interests were not "controlling"
and directors could prevent an offer if they believed it might ad-
versely 'impact on constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally).' The court also held that when a board cited a valid
threat and responded in a reasonable manner, the business judg-
ment rule would shield their actions unless the plaintiff could
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors acted
to perpetuate themselves in office. 10
In Moran v. Household International," the court applied the
Unocal analysis to the target board's adoption of a "poison pill"
that gave its shareholders the right to purchase shares of an ac-
quiror's company at half price, unless management approved the
acquiror's offer. This tactic would tend to stop potential acquirors
from making offers without the board's approval' 2 and preclude
shareholders from having the opportunity to decide if they wanted
to sell. Unlike Unocal, however, there was no raider, nor any im-
mediate threat at all. The court accepted a statement in the
board's minutes dictated by the directors' attorney, Martin Lipton,
which said the board adopted the poison pill because the directors
were concerned about "the increasing frequency of 'bust-up' take-
9. Id. at 955.
10. Id. at 953-59.
11. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
12. Mounting a takeover effort requires substantial expenditures, including legal fees and
commitment fees for financing. If management can throw up enough roadblocks so that
consummation is unlikely, fewer takeover attempts will be launched.
[Vol. 26:507
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overs, . . . and the possible adverse effect this type of activity
could have on employees and others ...."13
The court's acceptance of this "threat" was a declaration of open
season. In practice, with competent counsel, a board could cite a
theoretical threat to a non-shareholder constituency, thereby al-
lowing management to take control of the company's fate. The
court continued to pay lip service to the "omnipresent specter"
that management was acting to protect itself. However, once a
valid threat was cited and the response was deemed reasonable,
the burden shifted. The plaintiffs had to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the directors were really thinking about their
jobs, perks and prestige, and not about the workers whose welfare
they claimed to be protecting. The plaintiff's burden was almost
insurmountable absent a stool pigeon in the boardroom who would
stand up in court. It is hard to believe that Household Interna-
tional's board was thinking about workers and "others," and not
about themselves.14
B. A Temporary Setback: Sometimes Management Must Maxi-
mize Shareholder Value
A shift in judicial treatment of anti-takeover actions occurred in
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes.5 The board of Revlon reacted to
Ronald Perelman's tender offer by agreeing to sell the company to
Forstmann, Little & Company. Forstmann, Little had announced
that it would sell off the contact lens and pharmaceutical divisions,
two divisions which Perelman also intended to sell. The Revlon
court followed precedent, and latched onto the specific threat vali-
dated in Moran - the "bust-up" - and held that when a "bust-
up" and sale were "inevitable," the "duty of the board ...
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the share-
holders' benefit."' 6
The court followed precedent without analysis and reached a du-
bious conclusion. Neither Moran nor Revlon analyzed the impact
of a "bust-up." In fact, the sale of the pharmaceutical and contact
13. 500 A.2d at 1349. Lipton's reference to employees, one of the enumerated "constituen-
cies," may have been guided by the recent decision in Unocal.
14. See id. at 350-57.
15. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
16. Id. at 182.
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lens businesses did not end the existence of Revlon as a corporate
entity. After shedding some of its non-cosmetic businesses, Revlon
added new core divisions. Revlon remains a corporation with bil-
lions of dollars in annual sales. However, the court equated a
"bust-up" with the end of corporate existence and held that once a
"bust-up" was inevitable, "[t]he directors' role changed from de-
fenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with get-
ting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company."17
In other words, only in such limited situations must the directors
look out for the shareholders and not employees, the general com-
munity, "others" or themselves.
Revlon was an effort to respond to the Unocal and Moran deci-
sions that paved the way for actions which favored management
over the owners in the name of ill-defined "constituencies." Such
favoritism contravenes one of the basic principles of corporate law
- directors are fiduciaries of the shareholders. In Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.,'8 one of the classic cases in corporate law from the
height of the entrepreneurial era, the court held that a corporation
exists to make a profit for its shareholders, and not for the benefit
of employees or the welfare of society. The problem with Revlon is
that by blindly following the precedent of Moran, which decided
that a "bust-up" is a "valid" threat; and then holding that if a
"bust-up" is inevitable the directors have a duty to work for the
shareholders (and not for other constituencies), the court finessed
the real question: in general, who decides whether a business may
be sold - the individuals who own it or those who manage it?
17. Id.
18. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Henry Ford owned 58% of Ford Motors, and decided the
time had come to benefit society rather than accumulating yet more personal wealth. In-
stead of paying dividends, Ford plowed the money back into building new smelting plants
on the Rouge River. Ford declared, "My ambition is to employ still more men; to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible member, to help them build up
their lives and their homes." Although this was a case where the majority shareholder
wanted to benefit employees and the community (rather than a self-serving assertion by
entrenched management), the Michigan Supreme Court ordered the company to pay divi-
dends and held that,
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stock-
holders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end . . .It is not
within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a
corporation for the merely incidental benefit of the shareholders and for the primary




C. The Establishment Triumphant
Four years after Revlon, the court tackled the issue of who de-
cides whether a company is to be sold. By this time, however,
George Bush was in the White House, and the Reagan era was his-
tory. In tandem with the re-emergence of the political establish-
ment, the corporate elite once again carried the day. In Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc.,19 the court upheld the Time
board's decision to merge with Warner Communications, which, as
a practical matter, prevented Time's shareholders from considering
Paramount's offer to purchase Time for $200 per share, a 60% pre-
mium over market value. The court limited Revlon to the rare case
where a board acted to make a "bust-up" inevitable. In all other
situations, a board may preclude the owners from receiving an of-
fer by responding to a "valid" threat. What threats did the Para-
mount court cite? First, a threat to Time's culture.20 Second, a
threat to all the non-shareholder constituencies listed in Unocal.
Third, and most incredible, the threat that the target company's
shareholders might want to accept the offer in the "mistaken" be-
lief that holding their stock and relying on management's business
strategy was not as good a bet as the offer.21
The Paramount court stated that since Delaware's corporation
statute grants the power to "[manage] the business and affairs of
the corporation"22 to the directors, it is a misunderstanding of ba-
sic principles of corporate governance to suppose that anyone but
management can decide whether, when and to whom to sell the
company.
Unfortunately, the principle is not so clear. It is unclear (even
doubtful) that the decision to sell a business comes within the stat-
utory mandate to "manage. '23 The Paramount court based its de-
cision not on logic, precedent or a clear reading of the statutory
19. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
20. Time, Inc. is the publisher of, inter alia, People Magazine, Sports Illustrated and
Tales of the Unknown.
21. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1150-55. The court noted that "[C]ertain
Time directors expressed their concern that Time shareholders would not comprehend the
long term benefits of the Warner merger. . . . The board feared that. . . Paramount's cash
premium would be a tempting protect to these investors ... who might elect to tender into
Paramount's cash offer in ignorance." Id. at 1148-53.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. titl. 8 § 141(a) (1991 Repl. Vol.)).
23. Under principles of agency law, authority to manage a business does not include au-
thority to sell the business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 73 cmt. b (1958). According
to the American Law Institute,
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language, but on unarticulated values stemming from the estab-
lishment vision of corporate America.24
IV. THE PENDULUM SWINGS
As a postscript, I should point out that Paramount offered $200
a share for Time, an offer which the court and the board felt the
shareholders might have "mistakenly" accepted. Now, two years
later, the stock is valued at $100. Perhaps courts should let the
free market decide, even when corporate control is at issue. That
conservatives who pay lip service to free markets would applaud
the decision in Paramount is a testimonial to the influence of the
establishment vision.
By 1990, the pre-Paramount war on the corporate bastion was
part of history, as CEOs again basked in their perquisites. The rise
of the entrepreneurial ideal in political discourse had given way to
the re-emergence of establishment values, personified by George
Bush. In the social sphere, the enthusiastic celebration of yuppie
excess receded in the face of stability, tradition and frugality. In
the contest over corporate control waged in the Delaware courts,
the establishment emerged completely victorious as the challenge
to managements' power was crushed. In addition to several "gener-
ations" of specific anti-takeover statutes, twenty-eight states have
enacted statutes authorizing directors to consider the interests of
various "constituencies," in some cases even when the long-term
Shareholders normally have the right to sell their shares, free of ally restrictions, to
any person who wishes to purchase their stock. An action taken by the board that
interferes with that right, as by blocking a tender offer, goes well beyond the usual
board function of conducting the Corporation's business, and needs special
justification.
Moreover, directors may not block an unsolicited tender offer if that action would materially
disfavor the long-term interests of the shareholders. § 6.02 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE (Tenth Draft, 1990).
24. For an alternative approach, supplanted by Revlon, see Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), in which Chancellor Allen held that, "every instance in which
an incumbent board seeks to thwart a shareholder majority. . . involves allocation, between
shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power with respect to governance of the
corporation." Id. at 660. The Chancellor felt that
the only justification that can . . . be offered for the action taken is that the board
knows better than do the shareholders what is in the corporation's best interest.
While that premise is no doubt true for any number of matters, it is irrelevant . ..
The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as agents of the
shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.
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interests of shareholders would be harmed. 25 If one carefully exam-
ines the recent legislation, the fact that management is the true
beneficiary becomes clear. The vast majority of these statutes per-
mit directors to take actions that entrench management for the
supposed good of various "constituencies" but do not grant stand-
ing to the constituents to challenge management's actions.
We are currently in an era of diminished liquidity, when the
sources of credit that financed the raiders have run dry. Looking
back on the 1980's through establishment lenses, many blame our
current economic state (which resembles a hangover after a tre-
mendous party) on the junk bond raiders, without noting the gen-
eral over-heating of real estate, art and other markets that have
collapsed. Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial ideal remains firmly
embedded in American culture. There is already some grumbling
about excessive executive compensation. Some day the perquisites
of the establishment will once again seem too lavish. A new period
of optimism and liquidity will arise, and a new generation of insur-
gents will ride to battle against the forces of the corporate elite.
25. See IOWA CODE § 490.1108(1) (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. 351.347(1) (Vernon 1991); 1990
PA. LAWS 36; NEB. DEV. STAT. § 21-2035 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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